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Abstract
In a market-based nancial system, credit is held by dispersed creditors, and out-of-court
renegotiation of debt is more likely to fail because of hold-out problems; in a bank-based
system, out-of-court renegotiation stands good chances to succeed. Since out-of-court rene-
gotiation is a substitute for court-supervised reorganization, the design of a reorganization
law cannot abstract from the nancial system. Chapter 11-style renegotiation is shown to
benet public debt rms and to be harmful for private debt rms; the overall eect depends
on the nancial system, but is likely to be positive only in a market-based system. The
case for a reorganization law is weakened if dilution threats like exit consents are taken into
account: such a law is then in most cases undesirable. Legislation, however, which jointly
introduces a reorganization law while facilitating the use of dilution threats will improve
welfare in a market-based system, but reduce welfare in a bank-based system. Thus, the
paper identies a new determinant in the debate over optimal bankruptcy codes, which is
how easily dilution threats can be deployed.
Keywords : Workouts, reorganization law, Chapter 11, nancial systems, dilution threats,
exit consents, hold-in eect.
JEL Classication : G21, G32, G33, G34.
1. Introduction
In many European countries, there is an ongoing process and debate about bankruptcy law
reform, stimulated by what is perceived as the success of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Code of 1978. The French bankruptcy laws of 1985 and 1995 and the new German insol-
vency code enacted in 1999 have accordingly weakened creditor rights and facilitated court-
supervised reorganization.1 In Britain, where the Insolvency Code gives a clear advantage
to senior creditors, there is an active debate about reforming the bankruptcy legislation,2 as
for example in the Netherlands and Italy. The discussion is not conned to Western Europe:
Transition economies in East and Central Europe have faced the need for a massive and
parallel nancial restructuring of rms, and recent nancial crises in debt-laden emerging
markets have underscored the potentially high cost of insuÆcient bankruptcy laws and lack-
ing reorganization procedures. In a historical perspective, there is a striking coincidence
between major reforms of bankruptcy laws and of banking laws in the US and in Germany
(Hauswald (1996)).
The economic debate on the optimal reorganization law3 has long recognized that the
eÆciency of such a law should be gauged in light of the presumed performance of the mar-
ket solutions talking hold in the absence of a law, respectively the market for distressed
asset sales and out-of-court debt restructurings or workouts.4 There is substantial empirical
evidence that the credit structure of a distressed rm matters for the performance of the
market solutions, by showing that workouts are likely to fail when the rm's creditor base is
dispersed.5 This suggests that the optimal structure of a bankruptcy code depends on the
nancial system as the determinant of the typical degree of creditor dispersion.
If holdout problems among multiple creditors, together with imperfect markets for dis-
tressed assets, are the principal reason why market solutions may fail, then the analysis
should naturally investigate the mechanisms that could overcome the resistance of dispersed
creditors to make concessions. To have concessions decided upon by court order or majority
vote, typical features of a reorganization laws, is one obvious alternative. Another is to
1See e.g. Kaiser (1996) and White (1996).
2See Franks and Nyborg (1996).
3Recent contributions include Bebchuk (1988), Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), Berkovitch, Israel and
Zender (1998) and Cornelli and Felli (1997).
4The preeminent objection against a reorganization law, raised by Haugen and Senbet (1978) and others,
argues that workouts (out-of-court renegotiation) should be a perfect substitute for court-supervised reorga-
nization. The opposing view, dominant in the Law and Economics literature (see e.g. Jackson (1986)), argues
that court-supervised reorganization is needed to overcome ineÆciencies in out-of-court debt renegotiation,
which would be due to free-rider or hold-out problems.
5For US evidence, see for instance Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Gilson (1997), Franks and Torous
(1989), (1994), Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), James (1996), and Brown, James and Mooradian
(1995).
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give the debtor the means to force concessions by diluting the value of the claims of hold-
outs. Vehicles to engineer such dilution threats are e.g. exit consents, cash tender oers
and asset spin-os, and these devices are frequently adopted in distressed out-of-court debt
reschedulings.6
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the interdependence of bankruptcy law and nan-
cial system while explicitly (i) addressing the choice between court-supervised reorganization
and workouts, and (ii) taking into account that a distressed debtor can resort to dilution
threats like exit consents, potentially a powerful alternative to court-supervised reorganiza-
tion.
In the paper, workouts are analyzed in a situation of asymmetric information about the
true value of the rm. In the rst step of the analysis, only pari passu exchange oers are
considered in workouts, i.e. oers where creditors are proposed new debt claims of equal
seniority. A dispersed creditor structure will then lead to a renegotiation breakdown, while
debt renegotiation with a single lender is (second best) eÆcient. The paper proposes a
simple signaling explanation of the choice between private and public debt: Managers of
riskier rms will use bank loans because exible renegotiation of loans is more important to
them, but bank credit has higher interest rates. High-quality rms will issue public debt as
a credible signal of their quality, and get access to more attractive borrowing rates.
In this model, introducing a reorganization law is not necessarily eÆcient and the eÆ-
ciency varies across nancial systems. A reorganization law is more likely to be benecial
in a market-based system. It will speed up disintermediation, and increase the number of
bankruptcy lings - both of these predictions were observed in the United States after 1978
(reform of the Bankruptcy Code). Frequently cited shortcomings of the Chapter 11 proce-
dures are less harmful than commonly perceived, and they will typically even improve the
eÆciency of the reorganization procedure, as they increase the incentives to choose bank
debt and to renegotiate out of court. This is true for delays in the procedure, violations of
the absolute priority rule and management bias in the procedure.
In the second step, the assumption of pari passu renegotiation oers is abandoned and
renegotiation oers for more senior claims (dilution threats) are taken into account. The
question is then how these dilution threats aect the relationship between bankruptcy code
and nancial system. Dilution threats will always signicantly improve the chances for a
successful workout with diusely held debt. Should dilution threats therefore be welcomed,
as often suggested in the Law and Economics literature? And if so, should they be viewed as
a substitute or rather a complement of court-supervised reorganization? The analysis reveals
the following. Suppose dilution threats are possible, and the introduction of a reorganization
law is considered. The renegotiation eÆciency of public debt rms will actually go down in
6See Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) for a discussion of dilution threats and empirical references.
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this case, making the introduction of a reorganization law in most cases an undesirable move.
Conversely, suppose the question is whether the planned introduction of a reorganization
law should be accompanied by supporting nancial securities legislation permitting dilution
threats. The answer is aÆrmative in a market-based system, where such a coordinated
legislative is a welfare improvement. By contrast, in a bank-based system, it would reduce
welfare. Overall, the case for a reorganization law is weakened if dilution threats are taken
into account, but the optimal law design will again depend on the nancial system.
The present paper is a companion paper to Hege (2000), where an extensive and more
general account of the analysis with pari passu exchange oers is given. Hege (2000), however,
does not address dilution threats. A few other papers combine a choice between workouts
and court-supervised reorganization but they omit the debt structure choice and are of more
limited scope. Hold-out eects if there are many creditors are demonstrated in a few other
papers, notably Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). White (1994) conceives of Chapter 11 as a
ltering device which makes the emergence of ineÆcient pooling equilibria less likely. Two
earlier papers, Berkovitch and Israel (1999) and Detragiache (1994), discuss that the optimal
bankruptcy design may depend on the dominant debt source of rms, or on the nancial
system. Both papers, however, ignore the decision between workout and court-supervised
reorganization, and the alternative of dilution threats, and they do not consider that the
design of the reorganization procedure interacts with the composition of the nancial system.
Concerning dilution threats, Roe (1987) argues that they may be desirable by increasing
the chances that out-of-court restructurings succeed. By contrast, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991) and similarly Kahan and Tuckman (1993) argue that debtors can abuse them to
obtain excessive debt concessions, which may lead to additional sources of ineÆciencies like
overinvestment. Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) show that this problem goes all but away if
subsequent rounds of dilution threats are taken into account as well as the willingness of the
debtor to commit, via the design of the debt contract, to an ex post eÆcient renegotiation
strategy.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is set up in Section 2. The following two
Sections summarize results which have been developed and proved in Hege (2000): Section 3
reviews debt renegotiation and the market equilibrium, and Section 4, the impact of a court-
supervised reorganization procedure and of presumed deciencies in the US Bankruptcy
Code. Section 5 analyzes the model if the issue of more senior claims (dilution threats) are
taken into account. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Model
The model portrays a levered rm run by a risk-neutral owner-manager. In t0, the owner-
manager of the rm chooses between public debt (bonds) or bank debt, and in t1, the
owner-manager has access to an uncertain investment opportunity. All nancial variables
are expressed in t0 present values. The investment opportunity in t1 necessitates costs of I
which are unknown in t0. The common prior belief is that I is uniformly distributed over
a unit interval, I  U [I; I], where I = I + 1. In t1, the owner-manager learns privately
the realization of I, but investors remain uninformed about I. The project yields a sure
incremental cash ow of R. It is assumed that R  I > 1 , i.e. even the most costly project
is protable and yields an expected surplus, R   I, in excess of the interval of uncertainty
about the investment costs.7
From the assets already in place in t0, the rm derives an uncertain cash ow Y in t2. Y
determines whether the rm will have abundant or little internal funds available. As of t0, Y
is projected to be low, Y = Y , with probability  and high, Y = Y , with probability 1 . Y
is publicly observable in t1, and it determines the state at the time the investment decision is
made: In the good state Y the rm is rich in internal funds Y , while in the bad state Y the
rm is poor in internally generated cash and is likely to need outside funds to invest. The
probability  can be directly interpreted as the business risk of the rm, as will be seen. In
t0, the value  is private information of the rm's owner. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
is uniformly distributed with a minimum of  and a maximum of ,   U [; ]. The timing

















Figure 1: Time Line
t
As of t0, the rm has debt outstanding with a face value D, maturing in t2. We assume
that the owner-manager does not consider to reduce the leverage D by adding equity or
7This assumption is not essential for the results, but simplies the algebra. Also, we would obtain the
same result if we assumed that R is uncertain and I is known.
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another form of nancial security. The capital strcture choice of the owner-manager is only
whether to nance this debt with private debt, that is bank debt, or with publicly traded debt.
D is exogenously xed in spite of the cost of nancial distress which will be analyzed below.
This assumption should be interpreted as follows: There are advantages to debt nancing
which outweigh the nancial distress costs as of t0, though this dominance may be reversed
in t1 when the bad state Y is realized.
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Moreover, we assume that the debt level D is so high that:
Y +R  I > D > Y +R   I (1)
We briey discuss the implication of Assumption (1) on the investment decision in t1,
when the state Y is known. We start with the rst inequality, Y+R  I > D, which addresses
the good state Y . In the good state, the owner-manager can pledge a total deterministic
revenue of Y +R towards nanciers, of which D is already pledged away. Thus, the owner-
manager can raise in t1 incremental nancing of at most Y +R D. She needs to nance I.
The rst inequality assures that the incremental nancing constraint Y + R   D is always
larger than I, the highest possible investment need, so investment is always possible.
The second inequality, D > Y + R  I addresses the bad state Y . The owner-manager
can then only raise Y +R D in incremental nancing. The second inequality assures that
this is always lower than I, the minimal investment need. Thus, condition (1) implies that
the investment project can always be nanced in the good state, but never in the bad state.
Therefore, since undertaking the project would be desirable in all circumstances, a classic
debt overhang problem9 arises if and only if the bad state is realized. This overhang problem
creates a rationale for a state-contingent debt claim, i.e. the possibility to adjust D to a level
low enough so that the project can be nanced even in the bad state Y . State-contingent
debt can be obtained through debt renegotiation.
The timing in t1 is as follows. After Y is publicly revealed, debt can be renegotiated.
Renegotiation is modelled as a one stage take-it-or-leave oer. In case of public debt, the
owner-manager is making the oer. In case of bank debt, the bank makes the oer.10 There
is no cost associated with debt renegotiation.
The renegotiation game captures debt renegotiation out-of-court. After debt renegotia-
tion, any of the creditors can le for bankruptcy if the rm is not able to meet the payments
due in t1 or t2. Bankruptcy is tantamount to liquidation, as in Chapter 7 of the US Code.
8Hege (2000) rigorously derives the optimal capital structure in the same framework.
9See Myers (1977) for the origin of this concept.
10This bargaining model was chosen to capture two real world features: (i) Exchange oers are almost
always initiated by managers and decided upon by investors. (ii) Banks wield considerable bargaining power
in debt restructurings. The results are robust with respect to the renegotiation procedure.
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Then the investment opportunity I is lost and remaining assets are distributed respecting
priority. In the basic model, there is no court-supervised reorganization procedure. This is
introduced in Section 4.
In principle, neither the equityholder nor the owner-manager should retain any value
when the rm is in nancial distress. However, only the manager knows the true value of I
and how much debt reduction is precisely needed in order to realize the project value R  I.
He tries to solicit excessive debt reductions from the creditors so as to retain a positive value
when the rm emerges from debt renegotiation. The owner-manager may raise as much fresh
money as investors are willing to lend to him. Unless the rm is declared bankrupt, he can
keep, and ultimately consume, any amount raised in excess of I.
The workout is successful if and only if the debt level after renegotiation D does not
exceed R   I. If this condition is satised, D  R   I, then the owner-manager could
obtain funds from any of the following three sources: (i) The initial lender(s) how hold debt
claims worth D; (ii) the owner of the rm, provided she has a suÆciently deep pocket; (iii)
new investors. The reason that all three would make the same nancing decision, is that
any earlier investment is sunk and makes no dierence. Also, competition on the capital
markets ensures the nancier of the project receives a zero prot on the funds I. Therefore,
whether old or new investors provide the funds in t1, makes no dierence in the old investors'
renegotiation behavior.
The equilibrium concept applied throughout is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
3. No Reorganization Law
A. Renegotiating Private and Public Debt
We will solve the model backwards in the usual fashion, starting with the decisions
after the state is known. Renegotiation will only be undertaken if the bad state Y has been
realized. Only pari passu oers, oering debt claims of equal or lower priority, are considered
in this and the next Section.
In the case of private debt, the bank's take-it-or-leave-it oer will start renegotiation, and
the owner-manager will accept any oer that gives him more than zero. The bank has all
the bargaining power. Like a monopolist who takes demand eects into account when xing
prices, the bank solves for its optimal debt forgiveness by taking into account that more
concessions will increase the success probability of the workout. This success probability of
this oer will depend on the distribution of I which the bank has to guess. The analysis is
straightforward. Recall that the value of the good project R  I, is always larger than 1, the
interval of uncertainty about the true costs I. Therefore, the bank nds it optimal to make a
relatively large concession such that the remaining debt is just Y +R  I: The good project
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will always be possible, regardless of the true value of I. Making a less generous concession
reduces the success probability and gives the bank a smaller revenue.
Turning to the case of public debt, we assume that exchange oers are not made condi-
tional on unanimous consent. 11 It is useful to sketch some elements of the analysis since we
will use them again in Section 5; a full account can be found in Hege (2000). Suppose n  1
investors do exchange, and consider the problem of the n-th investor. The optimal exchange
oer, which is conditional on success, will oer to exchange each debt contract with face
value D=n for a new contract with lower face value of Y+V+x
n
, where x denotes the aggregate
debt level that is oered to the bondholders in excess of the face value that a bank would
keep. x 2 [0; 1] is chosen from the range of uncertainty about I, and captures at the same
time the bankruptcy probability. We can then analyze the n-th bondholder's incentives:
 If the n-th bondholder approves the exchange, then the success probability is 1   x.
The n-th investor would then earn a prot of e:
e = (1  x)






 If the n-th bondholder holds out, then this decision reduces the success probability for
the exchange oer overall by an amount of n(x), n's probability of being pivotal for







D=n with probability1  n(x)
Y =n with probability n(x)
The n-th bondholder will accept the exchange oer if h  e, or if (after simplications):
(1  n(x))D + n(x)Y  x+ Y +R  I (2)
Under the \best" exchange oer from the owner-manager's point of view, this incentive
constraint is just binding. For inequality (2) to be satised, n(x) must be strictly larger
than zero, since D > x + Y + R   I > Y . But then x ! 1 is necessary for n(x) to be
bounded away from zero. As the share of a single investor in the total debt gets smaller and
smaller, the probability of her being pivotal for the success of reorganization out of court
must vanish. This in turn implies that the ex ante probability of successful renegotiation
11Empirically, exchange oers are frequently made conditional on a certain threshold of approval, but
never on everyone's approval. A manager, when making an exchange oer simultaneously to many dispersed
bondholders, will not rely on all bondholders actually responding, let alone all bondholders responding
rationally. The assumption does not exclude that exchange oers are made conditional on success.
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goes to zero as the number of bondholders increases. We can summarize our insights as
follows:12
Observation 1: (i) If the rm uses private debt, then renegotiation is successful with
probability one.
(ii) If the rm issues public debt, then the probability of renegotiation being successful goes
to zero as n, the number of investors, goes to innity.
Incomplete information is a necessary ingredient for this result. If there was perfect
information about I then the owner-manager would submit an oer that is just suÆcient
to achieve eÆciency, but needs every single investor's approval. This is tantamount to
conditioning on unanimous approval.
B. The Market Equilibrium
Since  is private information of the owner-manager, the market equilibrium is a signaling
equilibrium where owner-managers self-select in their choice of debt instrument that will
truthfully disclose its according to their -type. The costly signal is the expected costs of
nancial distress which vary according to the type  and the debt instrument: The higher
the failure risk, the more benecial is it to have renegotiable private debt. Private debt is
eÆcient in the bad state, and moreover it oers a direct benet to the owner-manager in
form of a fraction of the renegotiation surplus. Owners who attach a low probability to
nancial distress prefer ineÆcient renegotiation. In turn, they will receive a more favorable
interest rate.
We guess that all types  higher than some cuto type C choose private debt, and all
types below C use public debt. When issuing private debt, debt with a face value of D will
be priced at an initial value of B0 < D, which discounts for the bankruptcy risk such that
a bank who does not know the type  excepts just a zero prot. Similarly, if the owner-
manager issues public debt with face value D, the issue value will be D0 < D.
13 In addition,






























the owner-manager of a bank-nanced expects to keep some surplus in the event of successful
renegotiation, which is equal to 1
2
.14
Comparison of the respective payos charecterizes the cuto type C , the type just in-









= (   ) (D   Y )  (R  I) : (5)
Equation (5) characterizes the separating market equilibrium, which expresses the follow-
ing trade-o: Because there is a continuum of types , but only a single discrete signal (the
choice between bank or public debt), rms self-select into two pools: Firms at the good end
of the quality interval,  2 [; C), will signal their high quality by using public debt. This
is cheaper, but implies higher costs in the event of nancial distress. Firms at the poor end
of the quality interval,  2 (C ; ], nd giving up debt renegotiation too costly. They prefer
to be pooled with all the rms at the risky end and to pay a higher risk premium. Either
such a separating equilibrium exists, or all rm types issue bank debt.15
4. Introducing a Reorganization Law
In this Section, court-supervised reorganization is introduced. In the extensive-form game,
court-supervised reorganization will be introduced as an alternative to straight bankruptcy:
after the workout, if the rm is still insolvent (i.e. cannot meet its obligations at t1 or t2) there
is now a choice between ling for straight liquidation as before or ling for court-supervised
reorganization. Creditors and the owner-manager have a right to le for court-supervised
reorganization if out-of-court renegotiation fails, as under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Code of 1978.
The reorganization procedure modelled here is inspired by Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Code of 1978. We begin by analyzing a \perfect" procedure, where we assume eÆcient
decision-making about continuation and liquidation, no delay, and respect for the priority
of claims. We will rst revisit the model under such a perfect procedure, and then briey
discuss how the outcome changes if imperfections in the Bankruptcy Code are taken into
account.
14Renegotiation succeeds with probability 1, the bank reduces its claim to D = R I , and the owner keeps
the remainder, which is R EI  D = 1
2
.
15The separating equilibrium will only exist if the cuto point C is strictly interior in the interval (; ).
Hege (2000) discusses the necessary and suÆcient conditions.
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A. Perfect Court-Supervised Reorganization
The reorganization procedure here is \perfect" or frictionless: The court decides without
any delay, and the court always takes the eÆcient decision concerning the continuation of the
rm, by imposing the minimum debt reduction needed to get the protable project going.
This implies that the court collects and publicly reveals the private information about the
investment cost I.16 Finally, the old creditors are given all the transferable surplus. Court-
supervised reorganization procedure, however, is costly: There is a at bankruptcy cost of
b < R  I having priority over creditors.17
With perfect court-supervised reorganization as an option, if renegotiation is not suc-
cessful, then creditors will le for court-supervised reorganization since bankruptcy costs are
below the expected value of the protable project, b < R   EI. The interesting part of
the results (Observation 2) refers to the case where b < 1, i.e. where b is smaller than the
range of values of I. Then even for a private debt rm, the workout will fail if investment
costs I are high, and the rm will end up in court-supervised reorganization with a positive
probability. The reason is that the owner-manager will only truthfully reveal that I < I + b
if renegotiation were to fail otherwise. By contrast, the prospects of working out public debt
(in the limit where the number of creditors n approaches innity) remain as slim as before.
The impact of introducing Chapter 11-style reorganization procedures can be summarized
as follows:
Observation 2: (i) With private debt, renegotiation will be successful with probability
minf1; bg.
(ii) With public debt, the probability of successful renegotiation goes to zero as the number
of creditors goes to innity.
(iii) The proportion of public debt rms and the number of bankruptcy lings (including
court-supervised reorganization) will increase after court-supervised reorganization is
introduced.
To see the intuition, consider part (iii) rst. In the separating market equilibrium, the
decision of the marginal rm using public debt is important, and it depends on two eects:
First, court-supervised reorganization mitigates the cost of nancial distress of this rm,
since only the bankruptcy cost b, but not the investment opportunity is lost if a workout
fails. The distress cost for high-quality rms is in fact reduced from R   I to b. Therefore,
16The latter assumption is probably quite realistic: Under Chapter 11, the manager is required to reveal
under oath all relevant information about the present nancial standing of the rm. Reorganization plans
are usually quite detailed and contain information not readily available to outside investors.
17The restriction b < R  I is obvious. Otherwise there is no gain from using court-supervised
reorganization.
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since distress costs are lower, the marginal credit risk quality of a rm nding public debt
attractive will also be lower. Second, banks take court-supervised reorganization into account
and make less generous oers in the renegotiation stage. This will reduce the probability of
avoiding bankruptcy to b from 1. In other words, deadweight losses now also arise for rms
using bank debt, even though they are smaller one than under public debt. Both eects
make private debt look less attractive than before. As for the increase in the number of
bankruptcy lings, there are two reasons: First, less rms will have bank debt which can
be renegotiated out-of-court. Second, of those, a greater proportion will not succeed in a
workout.
Importantly, court-supervised reorganization exerts countervailing eects on the debt
restructuring capacity of private and of public debt rms: It improves eÆciency for public
debt rms, but it aects private debt rms adversely. Moreover, there will be a third eect:
The proportion of public debt rms will grow due to the introduction of a reorganization.
But overall eÆciency is smaller for public debt rms than for private debt rms, implying a
negative welfare impact of the third eect.
The overall eÆciency impact of introducing a reorganization law is therefore ambiguous,
and it depends on the nancial system. Since the debt structure, which represents dierent
nancial systems, is endogenous in this model, the comparative statics of the underlying
nancial system requires to vary the exogenous parameter which drives the debt structure.
The adequate eÆciency criterion in the present model is comparing the total expected dead-
weight loss under nancial distress incurred under any of the bankruptcy law regimes. The
following result obtains:
Observation 3: The nancial system determines whether a perfect reorganization law is
eÆcient or not:
(i) In a bank-based system (in a system where the proportion of public debt rms is small),
introducing a perfect reorganization law is ineÆcient.
(ii) In a market-based system (in a system where the proportion of public debt rms is
large), introducing a perfect reorganization law is eÆcient.
A good intuition for Observation 3 is gained by rst considering only those rms that
do not change their creditor structure. Among these, rms with public debt gain, rms
with bank debt lose from introducing a perfect reorganization law. The eÆciency eect
of court-supervised reorganization must clearly be positive if a vast majority of rms have
dispersed public debt, and vice versa. It remains to consider the third eect, the shift in
the creditor structure leading to, on average, more public debt. This eect is dominated
by the direct eect if either private or public debt dominates over the range of rm types.
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In intermediate cases where both public and private debt are well-represented across the
range of rm types, this shift eect could be responsible for turning the total welfare impact
negative. Finally, if b is small, then the loss of using public debt instead of bank debt is
small, and a reorganization law is always eÆcient.
To summarize, the eÆciency of a reorganization law depends crucially on the dominant
source of borrowing, banks or bond markets. The more rms rely on market-based debt
instruments, the more likely will there be a benet from introducing a reorganization law.
Moreover, consider an economy with a massive bankruptcy problem, i.e. a country where
a large number of nancial distress case occur concomitantly, as it happened recently in
emerging market hit by nancial crises or in transition economies. The massive bankruptcy
problem is not in itself a suÆcient reason to recommend the introduction of a court-based
reorganization procedure: This inevitably lowers the incentives to successfully manage debt
renegotiation out-of-court, an eect which is likely to dominate in a bank-oriented nancial
system.
Therefore, the model has clear implications concerning the relationship between bankruptcy
costs and nancial system. The fact that a lean and fast reorganization procedure (where b
is small) is always eÆcient is by itself not surprising. Less expected, however, is the opposite
case: A bank-based nancial system may be better o having an \expensive" reorganiza-
tion procedure rather than a \cheap" one. An intuition can be gained from rehearsing the
implication of \perfect" court-supervised reorganization: Less costly bankruptcy procedures
weaken at the same time the ex post incentives for banks to renegotiate out-of-court and
the ex ante incentives for managers to choose private debt, and both eects have a negative
impact on the eÆciency of the law.
B. Imperfections in the Reorganization Procedure
The way Chapter 11 works in practice has attracted a great deal of criticism in recent
years.18 Attention has primarily focused on concerns that Chapter 11 (i) involves a long and
extremely costly procedure; that (ii) it leads to violations of the Absolute Priority Rule; and
that (iii) outcomes are ineÆcient, with typically a management bias leading systematically
to ineÆcient continuation of rm that should be liquidated. We will briey review how these
concerns would impact the performance and desirability of Chapter 11 in the present model.
(i) Cost and delays in the court-supervised reorganization procedure. We investigate the
comparative statics of a change in b, by assuming for simplicity that b < 1. A workout for
a bank-nanced rm will then fail with probability 1   b, causing a loss of b. For a public
debt rm, the workout will always fail, meaning that the bankruptcy cost b accrues always.
18See e.g. White (1989), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), Franks and Torous (1989)(1994), Aghion, Hart
and Moore (1992) and Bebchuk and Chang (1992).
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Therefore, the expected deadweight loss due to bankruptcy is (1   F (b))b + F (b)b(1   b),
where F (b) is the proportion of bank-nanced rms, F (b) = (   C) =(   ):
We nd that the expected deadweight loss due to bankruptcy may be increasing or
decreasing as a function of bankruptcy costs b. The reason for this ambiguity lies in the in-
teraction between court-supervised and out-of-court debt restructuring. Only if bankruptcy
costs are already low is a reduction b unambiguously a good thing. Otherwise, it may make
things worse. This is more likely to be the case if bankruptcy costs are relatively high (close
to or larger than 1). Moreover, the higher the proportion of public debt rms, the larger the
benet from a reduction in b.
This observation has a clear implication for a market-oriented nancial system like the
United States. The critiques that bankruptcy costs are excessive may well have a point since
US rms rely predominantly on the bond market for their debt nancing. However, making
the Chapter 11 procedure leaner and faster - this was the intention of the 1994 reform, and
could be the result if the incentives for reaching pre-packaged bankruptcy agreements are
further improved - could still have a negative eect overall. In the model, this is precisely
the case if b is high ! This can be interpreted as implying that a veritable trap for bankruptcy
reform may arise in a system where (i) public debt markets dominate and (ii) the costs of
legal procedures are high.
(ii) Violations of the Absolute Priority Rule. In practice, the absolute priority rule
(APR), the principle that junior claimants should not receive anything before all senior
claims have been served in full, is routinely violated19. Chapter 11 is often blamed for this, in
particular since incumbent management retains substantial control rights under Chapter 11:
Management has the exclusive initial right to submit a reorganization plan within 120 days,
and this deadline is frequently extended. After the reorganization plan has been submitted,
a vote will be held requiring the consent of at least two third of the claims and the claimants
in each class of claims (where classes are organized according to seniority). This implies
that the consent of the shareholders is needed.20 The requirement to win approval of the
shareholders is seen as a likely source for violations of APR. To incorporate these ideas, we
assume that the manager retains a positive benet f > 0 when the rm emerges from the
court procedure. The owner-manager's retention f is a convenient measure of the severity
of the violation of the Absolute Priority Rule (equity deviations).
Intuitively, one would expect that equity deviations should make public debt more at-
tractive - after all, the owner-manager receives a positive payo if the rm emerges from
19see e.g. Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), Franks and Torous (1989)(1994) and White (1989).
20If the reorganization plan fails to win approval, the court can move on to a \cram-down": roughly, a
cram-down amounts to setting up and enacting a reorganization plan without the claimholders' consent. As
the court is bound by rules, cram-down is generally a time-consuming and very costly procedure; it is hardly
used at all.
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bankruptcy, and this happens more frequently with public debt. This is, however, only one
side of the eects. The other side is that the bank will adjust its renegotiation strategies
endogenously to allow for equity deviations. The bank knows that its oer will not be ac-
cepted unless the owner-manager can retain at least f , and the bank oers accordingly. It
turns out that the two eects are exactly osetting: The increment in the owner-manager's
expected payo in the nancial distress case, if using public debt relative to bank debt,
does not depend on f , and neither does the market equilibrium, i.e. the fractions of rms
nanced by private or by public debt. The present model, by strictly focusing on the incen-
tive structure of debt renegotiation, oers the following explanation why equity deviations
are so systematic in practice: Equity deviations in court may be a good thing, or at least be
neutral, because they make it less attractive to opt for court-supervised procedures instead
of a workout.
(iii) Management bias of court-supervised reorganization. In the discussion surrounding
Chapter 11, the \management bias" of the procedure is frequently cited, which may be taken
as an indication that ineÆcient decision-making is more likely to suer from a distortion in
the opposite direction: In this view, courts tend to rule in favor of too much continuation
when liquidation would be eÆcient. The following is a typical story told in order to under-
stand how ineÆcient outcomes may come about: A coalition of manager and bankruptcy
judge can play a dominant role during reorganization. Managers have a straightforward
interest in the continuation of the rm, and they might nd support from a judge who is
afraid of liquidating an ailing enterprise prematurely. Together, they can easily keep the
rm aoat for a very long time, at the expense of creditors who see a drop in the liquidation
value in the meantime.
To introduce management bias in a certainly sketchy, and rather informal, manner, sup-
pose there is uncertainty about the quality of the project (i.e. about R), and suppose the
owner-manager has private information about the quality of the project. The private infor-
mation arrives after debt contracts are signed, but prior to the debt renegotiation stage at
the end of period 1. Suppose the owner-manager is willing to undertake the project even
if it is bad, because he draws a private benet from continuation. In our model, such a
private benet emerges endogenously, since the rm keeps some revenues whenever a suc-
cessful workout is engineered. We can then consider a comparison between two bankruptcy
procedures: In the perfect procedure, the court always gets informed about the project and
decides eÆciently. In the procedure with management bias, there are systematic errors in
the court's decision-making, of the sort that rms with bad projects are frequently continued
even though they should not. Following the by now familiar logic, the eective bankruptcy
costs are higher in the second case. Therefore, we nd that having a management bias in
the court-supervised reorganization procedure will, as compared to the perfect procedure,
always increase the share of bank debt, but have ambiguous welfare eects.
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5. Exchange Oers with Higher Seniority
A. Dilution Threats and Exit Consents
In this Section, we drop the assumption that only pari passu exchange oers, exchange
oers proposing new claims of lower or equal seniority, are possible. In the practice of
corporate bond workouts in the US, exchange oers proposing debt of higher seniority or
tender oer oering cash in exchange for surrendering the bonds are very common.21 A
popular tool are so-called exit consents: In an exit consent, the bondholders' approval of
more senior debt issues is tied to the opportunity to participate in the exchange oer, creating
a powerful tool to force dispersed creditors into accepting unfavorable exchange terms. More
specically, an exit consent is used if the corporate bond contains a seniority covenant,
i.e. a covenant prohibiting the issue of higher seniority debt without the consent of the
bondholders. The seniority covenant, which is not a core item protected by the unanimity
clause of the Trust Indenture Act, can be waived by the approval of a majority or super-
majority of bondholders. An exit consent ties the two provisions: Only those bondholders
which agreeing to the waiver of the seniority covenant may participate in the exchange for
new bonds of higher seniority.
Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) argue that besides exit consents, there are other ways
and means with a similar avor of exploiting the non-cohesiveness of dispersed creditors.
Consider the two essential value components of a debt claim with credit risk: Income rights
(coupons and repayments of principal) and liquidation rights in the case of bankruptcy.
Any vehicle which asks dispersed creditors for concessions in their income rights by oering
more or privileged liquidation rights uses the same economic mechanism of dilution which
is behind an exit consent: The improvement in liquidation rights must come at the expense
of other creditors, since in the case of bankruptcy, the remaining rm value belongs to the
creditors (Absolute Priority Rule). Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) call all vehicles relying
on this mechanism dilution threats; popular examples are cash oers, assets sales and asset
spin-os.
In the legal literature, exit consents are typically seen in a favorable light, in spite of
the potential abuse of creditors' right which they may entail. The argument, elaborated
e.g. by Roe (1987), is that by forcing debtholders to make concessions, they are an eective
means of keeping hold-out problems among many dispersed debtholders in check. Hege and
Mella-Barral (2000) nd similarly that it is in the shareholders interest to design the debt
contract in a way which commits them to use exit consents in an eÆcient way. They may
then be the only means of introducing a renegotiation option into widely dispersed debt.
21Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Brown et.al. (1993), Chatterjee et.al. (1995) all document this in their
distressed rms samples.
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Shareholders, however, may not limit the use of exit consents to such eÆcient purposes,
they may also deploy them in a purely opportunistic fashion to increase equity value at the
expense of debt values. This aspect is highlighted in the analysis of Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991): They show that shareholders may abuse exit consents to obtain ineÆcient debt
concessions, causing rms to overinvest and thus destroy value. The authors call this the
\hold-in" eect. For similar reasons, Coee and Klein (1991) argue in favor of abolishing exit
consent. Kahan and Tuckman (1993), however, nd in their empirical analysis no indication
that hold-ins are a concern in reality.
This is the backdrop of our analysis here, which investigates the following question: How
does the interdependence of nancial system and reorganization law change if dilution threats
are possible?
B. No Reorganization Law
In analogy to Section 2, we assume rst that there is no reorganization law. We analyze
again the n-th bondholder's incentives:




in exchange for surrendering each bond with a face value of D=n,
so she is asked for a concession of D̂=n = D=n   Y+R I+x
n
. As before, xS 2 [0; 1] is
chosen from the range of values of I for which information is incomplete, and xS is at
the same time the probability that the workout fails whereas the success probability is





Y +R  I + xS
n
:
 If the n-th bondholder holds out, then this decision reduces the success probability for
the exchange oer overall by an amount of S(x), n's probability of being pivotal for
the success, where S(xS) = D̂
(1 xS)n
: The optimal strategy for the owner-manager in
this case is to make an unconditional oer, guaranteeing that tendering bondholders are
senior to all holdouts if the oer fails (not enough capital can be raised to nance I).22
A holdout bondholder will then anticipate that she will be junior to all bondholders who
accept the exchange oer. We anticipate that in equilibrium, all bondholders will have
the right incentives to accept the oer, so when calculating her prots as a holdout,
the bondholder needs to take into account that all n  1 other bondholders accept and
become senior to her. Therefore, the n-th bondholder's expected payo h in this case
22Moreover, the owner-mamanger will set the minimum acceptance rate suÆciently low to guarantee that






D1=n with probability (1  x
S)(1  S(xS))
max(0; Y   n 1
n
(Y +R  I + xS)) with probability xS + (1  xS)S(xS)
:
When the number of shareholders n becomes larger and larger, obviously max(0; Y  
n 1
n
(Y +R  I+xS)) = 0 at some point. Assuming that the incentive condition for the n-th
bondholder accepting the exchange oer (if all other bondholders tendering), h  e, holds
with equality, it can be written as:
(1  xS)(1  S(x))D1 = Y + (R  I + x
S)(1  xS) : (6)
This is a quadratic equation in xS:
xS
2
  xS(D1   R  I + 1) +D1   Y   R  I = 0 : (7)
But the latter equation can be true even if 1 S(xS)! 1, as long as xS, i.e. the chance
of a failure of the exchange oer, is large enough. Investigation of the properties of this
quadratic expression gives us the following result:
Proposition 1: Suppose there is no court-supervised reorganization procedure and exchange
oers attaching dilution threats are possible. Suppose the number of investors n goes to
innity.
(i) Out-of-court renegotiation of public debt fails with a probability xS which is positive but
strictly less than one.
(ii) The smaller the return R and the larger the creditors' minimum concession D   (R  
I)  Y , the larger is the probability xS of renegotiation failure.
Proof: See the Appendix.
2
In the proof, we also show that no other equilibrium exists. Part (i) of Proposition 1
needs to be contrasted with Observation 1. There, it was shown that exchange oers will
always fail when senior oers were excluded. Now, there is always a positive probability
for an exchange oer to succeed, even if debt is maximally dispersed. The reason for this
dierence is the eect of the dilution threat: The essential mechanism of oering senior debt
is to dilute the value of bondholders attempting to hold out. That means that if the number
of tendering bondholders is large enough, not only will the minimum acceptance rate of the
exchange oer be met, but all of the remaining asset values will be distributed among those
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debtholders that have tendered, leaving nothing to the holdouts. As a consequence, the
position of a potential holdout is weakened, explaining the result.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 discusses the comparative statics which are easy to understand:
the more bondholders collectively stand to loose by accepting the oer compared to their
nominal claim, captured by the minimum concession D (R I) Y , the higher must be the
stakes for a bondholder attampting to hold out in order to guarantee the incentive condition
e  h, i.e. the larger must be the probability that the workout attempt fails and that
consequently, the holdouts receive nothing.
C. Perfect Reorganization Law
Next, we turn to the case where a perfect reorganization law is introduced. We consider
two questions: (i) If the existing nancial securities laws give debt issuers a wide margin
of exercising dilution threats against debtholders, for example via exit consents, how would
this aect our analysis concerning the eects of introducing a reorganization law? (ii) When
introducing a reorganization law, should it be accompanied by an amendment of the nancial
securities legislation facilitating the use of dilution threats?
(i) Redoing the analysis to answer the rst question, we nd that h, the payo of a
holdout bondholder, is unchanged, at least as long n is large (that is, so large that under an
unconditional oer, holdouts receive nothing in case the exchange oer fails.) However, the
payo of tendering bondholders is dierent: if the exchange oer fails, the rm will then go
into court-supervised reorganization, implying an aggregate loss of only b to the investors.




Y +R  I + xR with probability 1  xR
Y +R  I + 1
2
xR   b with probabilityxR
:





  xR(D + 1  b) + (D   Y  R  I) = 0 : (8)
The comparison of the two quadratic expressions allows us to analyze the eects of
introducing a reorganization law, under the assumption that exchange oers for more senior
claims are possible. We nd:
Proposition 2: Suppose exchange oers oering more senior debt are possible. Consider
public debt as n goes to innity.
(i) The failure probability of out-of-court renegotiation with public debt is strictly larger
than in the absence of a reorganization law.
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(ii) The welfare eect of introducing a perfect reorganization law is always negative in a
bank-based nancial system, and more often negative in a market-based nancial system
than it was with pari-passu oers.
Proof: See the Appendix.
2
Thus, the answer to the rst question is markedly dierent from what was the case
without dilution threats (Observation 3): If they have access to the use of dilution threats,
public debt rms work out more eÆciently without a reorganization law.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that if the possibility to attach dilution threats is already
established, the welfare analysis of a reorganization law is dramatically dierent. Since it
will increase the nancial distress cost for public debt rms and leave then unchanged for
bank debt rms, the average nancial distress costs in most cases will go up. Only the third
and indirect eect making rms migrate from public to bank debt is now positive, but this
eect is likely to be dominated by the direct eects.
(ii) What does this then imply for the welfare impact of introducing a joint regime of
a perfect reorganization law together with legislation facilitating the use of dilution threats
like exit consents? Recall that public debt rms will work out more eÆciently with dilution
threats than without (Proposition 1), but less eÆciently in the joint regime than if dilution
threats stand alone without a reorganization law (Proposition 2). This is the backdrop for
this analysis, for which we the following eects:
Proposition 3: (i) In a market-based nancial system, if a joint regime (reorganization
law plus possibility to attach dilution threats) is introduced, the welfare impact is positive.
(ii) In a bank-based system, if a joint regime is introduced, the welfare impact is negative.
Proof: See the Appendix.
2
The intuition for this nding is not far them the reason behind Observation 3: Public
debt rms benet, bank debt rms suer from the introduction of the joint regime, and
nally there is a indirect third eect making marginal bank debt rms switch to public debt.
The overall welfare eect depends on which of the segments was dominating prior to the
introduction of the joint regime.
D. Comparative Statics of Bankruptcy Costs
Finally, we explore the following question how the cost eÆciency of the reorganization
procedure impacts the design of the reorganization law. Here, we take up the rst step of
our analysis of imperfections in the reorganization law, the comparative statics with respect
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to the bankruptcy costs b. Recall that we found in Section 3 that an increase in b has an
ambiguous eect: It makes reorganization more costly, but improves the incentives to use
bank debt, and to work out more eÆciently.
How is this analysis changed if we allow for exchange oer proposing more senior claims
does a decrease in bankruptcy costs b change the eÆciency of public debt rms? We nd
the following rather surprising answer:
Proposition 4:
(i) The failure probability of out-of-court renegotiation is strictly increasing in b for public
debt, but strictly decreasing in b for bank debt.
(ii) For bankruptcy costs b being low enough, public debt rms have a higher probability of
successful out-of-court renegotiation than bank-nanced rms.
Proof: See the Appendix.
2
Proposition 4 shows that the lower are total bankruptcy costs b, the more eective is a
reorganization law in giving incentives for successful debt renegotiation out-of-court. The
reason is that the smaller is b, the less stand tendering bondholders to lose form a failure of
reorganization, therefore the less often is breakdown needed to deter holdouts.
This is in remarkable contrast to the eect which a reorganization law has on bank-
nanced rms: The smaller is b, the less likely is a bank-nanced rm to successfully work
out. As a result, for rather low values of b, it is actually possible that the eÆciency properties
of both types of rms cross over, i.e. public debt rms are becomig the more eÆcient ones,
as far as the nancial distress costs are concerned.
What does this imply for the market equilibrium? With public debt suddenly the more
eÆcient debt form for rms in nancial distress, it is clear that issuing public debt cannot
work any longer as a signal for a low expected risk of getting into nancial distress. This role
will now be taken over by bank debt, since it carries the higher bankruptcy costs; issuing
bank debt can therefore credibly convey the signal that the owner-manager anticipates a
low risk of distress. The separating equilibrium ips over: High risk rms will issue public
debt, and low risk rms will use the less renegotiation-friendly bank debt, but get a more
favorable lending rate in return.23
23This is true if the parameter constellation supports a separating equilibrium; the conditions for that are
analogous to those conditions (??) and (??). If this is not the case, then all rms issue public debt.
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6. Conclusion
This paper discusses how the introduction of a reorganization law depends on the nancial
system. In a bank-based system, debtors tend to have credit from a single or a few lenders,
while in a market-based system, tradeable debt instruents are preferred and creditors of a
company tend to be more dispersed. A reorganization law like the US Bankruptcy Code
of 1978 will only be benecial if the typical creditor structure is suÆciently dispersed so
as to create serious hold-out problems; otherwise it will do more harm than good, since
it diminishes incentives to nd privately negotiated solutions. The policy debate on the
bankruptcy law needs to take these general equilibrium eects into account.
This paper specically addresses the role of a reorganization law if the debtor can take
recourse to dilution threats as an alternative tool to overcome holdout problems. Dilution
thrats are the possibility to oer senior claims to creditors willing to exchange, while eroding
the value of potential holdouts. The paper conrms that dilution threats can go a long way
to establish the eÆciency of out-of-court renegotiation even with a dispersed creditor base.
They substantially diminish the benets from a reorganization law even in a market-based
system, while leaving the negative judgment about reorganization laws in bank-based systems
unchanged. Thus, on balance, dilution threats further weaken the case for a reorganization
law.
Starting from a situation where neither dilution threats nor a reorganization law are
available, passing legislation which at the same time introduces a reorganization law and
makes dilution threats feasible has a positive welfare impact in a market-basd system, but a
negative impact in a bank-based system.
In a wider perspective, this analysis shows that legislation regulating how debtors can
use dilution threats is an essential complement to the optimal bankruptcy legislation. This




Proof of Proposition 1: First, one can verify that there is no mixed strategy separating
equilibrium. This is for the same reason as in the absence of senior oers: For a mixed
strategy equilibrium, h = e would have to hold. But x under the condition h = e is
independent of R  I. So the exchange oer cannot release information about the true value
of the rm when it has simultaneously to satisfy the equilibrium constraint. Then there is
a pooling equilibrium where all types of I will pool for a common oer, and some types will
propose oers that will be unsuccessful even if accepted.
We are left with the proof of the properties of xS as implicitly dened by (7). First,
setting xS = 0 in (7) yields:
D   Y   R  I > 0 : (A.1)
Second, setting xS = 1 in (7) yields:
 Y < 0 : (A.2)
Dierentiating (7) yields:
2xS   (D   Y  R   I) < 0 : (A.3)
Note that the LHS of (A.3) is negative 8xS 2 (0; 1) since D   Y   R   I > 1 from
the parameter assumption (1). Since (7) is continuous and continuously dierentiable, this
proves the claim that there is a unique solution of (7) xS 2 (0; 1).
Next, note that
q
(D  R   I + 1)2   4(D  R  I   Y ) =
q
(D   R  I   1)2 + 4Y .




(D  R  I + 1) 
q
(D   R  I   1)2 + 4Y : (A.4)







1  (D   R  I   1)((D   R  I   1)2 + 4Y ) 1=2











< 0 follows directly from inspecting (A.4).
2
Proof of Proposition 2: h can be written analogously to Proposition 1, e and the
quadratic expression (8) for xR guaranteeing the incentive condition e  h are stated in
the text.
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We need to show that xR > xS . Equating (7) and (8) shows that xS and xR will satisfy:
xS
2





  xR(D   b + 1) : (A.6)
Moreover, both sides in (A.6) are equal to =  (D   R   R   I) < 0. Draw the curve
of xS
2




  xR(D   b + 1). Since R   I > b and both
brackets in (A.6) are positive, xS
2





 xR(D  b+1), for all xS = xR 2 [0; 1]. It follows that to satisfy equality at a negative
value,  (D   R  R  I), xR > xS . 2
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall that there are three eects to be taken into account: the
welfare eect on public debt rms (positive), on bank debt rms (negative if b < 1) and on
rms switching from private to public debt (negative).
Suppose almost all rms are nanced by public debt. Then the eect on public debt
rms will be dominant, since the mass of bank-debt rms and the mass of bank debt rms
switching to public debt are negligible. The overall eect must be positive.
Suppose almost all rms are bank nanced and b < 1. Then the eect on bank rms is
negative and the eect on rms switching from bank debt to public debt is also negative,
while the positive eect on public debt rms is negligible. 2




xR   (D   b+ 1)

+ xR = 0 :




The claim concerning private debt rms is proven in Hege (2000). (ii) Notice rst that the
probabilities for both types for of rms are continuous in b. Consider then the case of b! 0.
Following Observation 2(i), this implies that renegotiation with bank debt will always fail.
(See Hege (2000) for a proof). On the other hand, with public debt we know that this






  xR(D + 1) + (D   Y  R   I) = 0 : (A.7)
Now suppose that xR ! 1. Then consider (A.7) for xR = 1:
1
2
  (D + 1) + (D   Y   R  I) < 0 : (A.8)
which gives a contradiction, showing the claim. 2
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